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NOTE AND COMMENT 
THI! MORTGAGES IN POSSESSION IN NEW YORK AND IN MICHIGAN.-It is in-
teresting to observe how tenaciously the old common law of mortgages has 
persisted in the state of New York, the very cradle of the modern lien theory of 
the mortgage. As early as 1802 Chancellor KENT began the importation into 
that state of Lord MANSFIELD'S Civil Law doctrines of mortgage. J olmson v. 
Hart, 3 Johns. Cas. 322. In 1814, in the case of Runyan v. Mersereau, II Johns. 
534. the lien theory definitely triumphed over the old law. In other cases, both 
before and since the statute of 1828 denying ejectment to the mortgagee, the 
d~tails of mortgage law were worked over to harmonize with the central 
-theory. 
Yet at all times there was a discordant element in the cases dealing with 
the mortgagee in possession. This became most obvious in the case of Phyfe 
v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248, decided by the Supreme Court in 1836. It was there 
held that to an action of ejectment it was a complete defense to show that de-
fendant was an assignee of a mortgage past due. Three distinct arguments are 
advanced in the opinion: one of policy, that litigation and expense are saved by 
permitting the mortgagee in possession to retain possession until redeemed, 
instead of allowing him to be turned out by an action of ejectment and so 
putting him to an action of foreclosure; an argument as to the technical 
nature of a mortgage, that the mortgagee "is still considered as having the 
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legal 'estate after condition broken"; and lastly the argument from authority, 
with citation of earlier New York cases upon the mortgagee's right of pos-
session. The argument of policy leaves us at best upon debatable ground. 
The argument that the mortgagee had a legal title after default was out of 
harmony with the later cases. And the argument from the authorities was 
an appeal to decisions which were subject to reconsideration in the light of 
the admittedly revolutionary theory of the mortgage at this time prevailing. 
\Ve may accept the ruling that the statute denying ejectment did not neces-
sarily alter the substantive rights of the mortgagee, for there are several in-
stances in which our law recognizes a right although there is no direct action 
available for its enforcement, e. g., in the case of contracts unenforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Limitations. The difficulty was 
that there had been a judicial amendment of the law of mortgages, which 
made the recognition of a right of possession in the mortgagee an anachron-
ism. This doctrine, however, found favor in the courts of New York (and 
elsewhere, of course, but that is another story) so that by 1875 the anomaly 
was imbedded in a dozen or more decisions and dicta. 
In Phyfe v. Riley we are not told how the defendant got into possession, 
and the only indication that the court attached any importance to that matter 
lies in the observation that "if the mortgagee, after forfeiture, obtains posses-
sion in some legal mode," there is no reason for depriving him of it. ''Legal 
mode" was, of course, a question-begging expression, but it is quite clear that 
it was not intended to limit the mortgagee to an entry under circumstances, 
such as consent of the owner, which would legalize an entry by an entire 
stranger. At the same time, obvious considerations of public policy prohib-
ited the legalization of an entry by force, perhaps by fraud as well. Thus 
the state of the law was fairly summed up by DF.NIO, ]., in Pell v. Ulnzar, 18 
N. Y. 139, in the dictum that, "if the mortgagee obtains possession witho11t 
force he is entitled" to hold it. Perhaps the most important application of 
this doctrine was to the case of one who took possession under a defective 
foreclosure. Thus in Fo.-r v. Lipe, 24 W'end. 164, where ejectment was brought 
against a mortgagee who had entered under a statutory foreclosure, it was 
held to be unnecessary to decide whether the foreclosure was valid or void. 
And in Tow11slzc11d \'. Tlzomson, 139 N. Y. 152, it was said, "A purchaser at 
a mortgage foreclosure sale, defective and void as against the owner of the 
equity of redemption because he was not made a party to the foreclosure 
action, becomes a mortgagee in possession." 
The last citation brings us down to 1893. In the meantime, however, a 
counter tendency had begun to show itself. In the case of Howell v. Leavitt, 
95 N. Y. 617, decided by the Court of Appeals in 1884, a mortgagee foreclosed 
by action without making the owners of the equity of redemption parties, 
purchased on the foreclosure sale, and, with the aid of a writ of assistance, 
put out the party in possession, who was a tenant of the owners of the equity, 
and so got into possession. The owners of the equity brought ejectment and 
were successful. Emphasis 'was put upon the forcible method of gaining 
possession, but Justice FINCH, with characteristic force, showed the true 
nature of the previously accepted doctrine of the mortgagee in possession as 
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an isolated survival of an ontworn creed. This case was followed, in 1908, 
by Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, in which it was held that one who 
went into possession as lessee of a life tenant was not, by the purchase of an 
outstanding mortgage, entitled to retain the possession after the death of the 
life tenant, without the consent of the then owners. Emphasis was put upon 
the defendant's covenant to surrender possession at the termination of the 
lease and upon the fact that she never asserted any right of possession under 
the mortgage, but the court again criticized adversely the old doctrine of the 
mortgagee in possession. 
The old doctrine was certainly shaken, but it was still possible to argue 
that it remained the law of New York. The two cases last considered might, 
up.on their facts, stand with it in perfect harmony. The former was within 
the long recognized exception as to possession forcibly obtained; the latter 
might be regarded as a case of possessi•m fraudulently obtained and be 
classed, with Russell. v. El:J•, 2 Black (lT. S.) 575, where the leasehold was in 
a third person who, without the consent of his lessor, delivered possession t<> 
the mortgagee after the expiration of his lease. 
But a further blow has now been struck at the old doctrine. In the case 
of H er111a111i v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. 'l. 526, II2 N. E. 476, decided by 
the Court of Appeals in April, 19:;:6, the facts were like thoi<e of H oweil v. 
Leavitt, supra, except that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale appeared to 
have taken possession without the use of force, so that the case came squarely 
within the older authorities. The court, however, declined to distinguish the 
case from that of Howell v. Leavitt, disposed of To1011slze11d v. Thomson by 
resting it upon acquiescence of the owner, again condemned the doctrine of 
the older cases, and declared that in order to establish the rights of a mort-
gagee in possession, one must show entry with t!ze co11se11t of the owner, or 
"otherwise lawful," the latter expression now clearly meaning, in the light 
of all that is said in this case and that of Barson v. Mulligan, an entry which 
would be lawful without aid of the mortgage, for "it is plain that the mort-
gagee has no means of getting possession that a stranger has not." (Barson 
v. Mulligaii.) The New York courts have arrived at last at the logical posi-
tion which the Supreme Court of Michigan took when first presented with 
this problem forty years ago. Newton v. McKay, 30 Mich. 38o. 
The lien theory of the mortgage might now seem to have completely tri-
umphed in New York, and the problem of the mortgagee in possession te> 
have been finally solved. Ii: is submitted, however, that some ground remains 
to be cleared. It is the theory of the latest cases that the mortgagee has, by 
virtue of his mortgage alone, no greater right to enter than a stranger-he 
may enter only with the consent of the owner, or under other circumstances 
(if any there be) which would authorize entry by a stranger. But suppose 
he enters with the consent of the owner, what fr, his right then? If hi~ mort-
gage gave him no more right to enter than a stranger's, does his mortgage 
give his entry with the consent of the owner any greater effect than a similar 
entry by the stranger? If not, is he more than a tenant at will? The Supreme 
Court of Michigan has never gone further than to say that he cannot be 
turned out without notice. B:J•ers v. B:i1ers, 65 Mich. 5g8. The Court of Ap-
NOTE AND COMMENT 61 
Jleals of New York has held, as late as the case of Tow11slze11d v. Thomson, 
(now interpreted as resting on acquiescen<"e,) that the mortgagee in posses-
sion can defend his possession until his mortgage is paid. That case has not 
as yet been questioned as to this point, but it will be sooner or later and the 
-courts will have to decide whether they will follow the logic of the lien theory 
further, or cling to this fragment of the older law. 
E.N.D. 
DowER IN AN EsT.'\.'fE IN FEF. SUBJECT To AN ExEcuToRY Dsv1sE.-For the 
first time the question whether a wife has dower in an estate held by her hus-
band in fee subject to an executory devise has arisen in Rhode Island. Shef-
field v. Cooke, 98 At!. 161. One J. ]. C., seised in fee, devised lands to his 
son, H. W. C., his heirs and assigns forever, "if, however, * * * my younger 
<laughter A. E. C. surYive my said son and his descendants," then all lands 
·over to X. H. \V. C. married, had two children who are living, and died, his 
wife A. H. R. C. surviving. A. E. C. is still alive and H. W. C.'s wife is 
-claiming dower. "While it is evident that since H. W. C.'s descendants are 
still living the contingency on the happening of which the fee in H. W. C. 
would be terminated has not occurred, yet as it was necessary for the court 
to decide whether any dower set off to A. H. R. C. would be terminated if the 
-executory limitation should take effect, the question was squarely raised. The 
-court decided it in accordance with the weight of authority, that the happening 
-0f the contingency and the limitation of the estate of the husband oYer to X 
·would have no effect on the dower rights of the wife. 
It might be thought that because dower and curtesy are at least dependent 
upon an estate in the husband or wife, as the case may be-if they are not 
-even incidents of that estate-that any termination of such estate would 
-destroy or terminate the dower or curtesy. But a long time ago some de-
cisions were made which are hard to explain other than as exceptions to the 
-above seemingly logical statement By these decisions it was settled that 
·curtesy or dower persists in a fee simple estate which has escheated for want 
.of heirs, or in a fee tail estate which has reverted to the grantor because of 
failure of the specified sort of heirs. Paine's Case (Samnes v. Pai11e), S Coke 
343-, 77 Eng. Rep. 524; 2 COKE, LITTLETON, (Butler and Hargrave's edition), 
241a, note. Why these cases were decided as they were is rather hard to say. 
Reasons have been given, such as Cox.e's ''for that it is taciie implied in the 
gift" But, as BRIGHT queries, if the estate itself has been defeated by the 
-death of the holder without heirs why sho!.tld a mere incident of that estate, 
a something attached to it la cite, by implkation, survh·e? Probably because 
the early judges desired to protect dower and curtesy, and after having done 
so, sought to explain their action by principles ":-ather to be guessed at than 
-demonstrated.'' 2 BRIGHT, HUSBAND & Vv1FE, 467. 
However if the estate granted to the husband was subject to a condition 
subsequent, for breach of which the grantor entered, then by legal legerde-
main the grantee's estate was considered a5 void ab initio and, of course, the 
-dower attached to such estate perished. PARK, DowER, 70; 4 KENT, Co:MM. 
(12th ed.) 49. 
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~N'.l' distinguishes between these two cases (4 K~N'.l', Co:r.n.r. (12th ed.} 
34.) in that where a donor enters for a breach of condition he destroys the 
estate he had granted, whereas when an estate escheats or reverts it merely 
shifts, and whatever incidents were attached to it persist. This is not a dis-
tinction without a difference and arises logically if it be granted that COKE" 
correctly stated the law when he said that to every estate granted there was 
tacite granted also the right to have dower attach to that estate though the 
heirs to whom the estate was granted fail, and that PARK correctly stated 
the legal theory that the entry of a grantor for condition broken avoids the 
estate. 
So when we come to the question whether dower should persist in an estate 
in fee subject to an executory devise, but one thing need bother us: does 
such a limitation shift the estate, or does it, like an entry for condition broken, 
avoid the estate? The courts have not openly answered this question, and the 
majority of them have been content to follow B1tckworth v. Tltirkell, 3 Bos. ' 
& Pu!. 652, 127 Eng. Rep. 351, note. This case decided that a husband was. 
entitled to curtesy in an estate held by his wife in fee simple, subject to an 
executory devise. The courts apparently in following Buckworth v. Tlzirkell 
have often failed to understand the mooted questions they were so lightly 
passing over. Lord MANSFIELD, in rendering his opinion in .Buckworth v. 
Thirkell, proceeded on the theory that an executory devise was merely a lim-
itation, in the sense that a fee tail estate is limited, rather than a condition ; 
that, consequently, the rule which earlier cases had made applicable to lim-
ited estates was applicable here, i. e., that dower was not barred. PARK con-
tends that an executory limitation is really a conditional limitation to which 
the contrary rule should apply. As a reason for this belief he cites the fact 
that the devisee of an estate in fee subject to an exectttory limitation over 
could not prevent the operation of the limitation, whereas the devisee of an 
estate tail could bar the entail, and, moreover "the distinguishing feature of 
all devises in fee subject to an executory devise is, that after the whole fee 
is first devised, it is made defeasible by a subsequent clause. Now, neither an 
estate in fee simple conditional. nor an estate tail, has any such defeasible 
quality or incident annexed to it, but this quality forms the very essence of 
all other estates on condition." PARK, Do\VJ;R, 83. Other writers have agreed 
with PARK: 4 ~N'.l', Co:r.n.r. (12th ed.) 50; 2 BRIGH'.l', HusBAND AND WrFt, 
467. Some few cases have been content to follow these text writers rather 
than the case of Buckworth v. Thirkell: Weller v. Weller, 28 Barbour (N. 
Y.) 588; Hatfield v. Sneden, 42 Barbour (N. Y.) 615; Edwards v. Bibb, 54 
Ala. 475. But the vast weight of authority is in accord with Buckworth v. 
Tltirkell. Moody v. King, 2 Bing. 447; Evans v. Evans, 9 Barr (9 Pa.) 190;. 
Northcut v. Whipp, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 65; Millege v. Lamar, 4 Desaus. (S. 
C.) 617. In support of these cases which have allowed dower or curtesy in 
such an estate, propably all the reasons of policy, which made Co~ and his 
associates anxious to preserve rather than to defeat dower and curtesy, still 
exist. Besides this, there is that sanction which comes from any law, logicaI 
or illogical, that is venerable if not yenerated. Probably it breeds less con-
fusion to have another jurisdiction sanction and adopt a rule which most of 
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its neighbors have long sworn by, if the rule is not vicious, than to have it 
declare and uphold a rule possibly more logically in accord with some of the 
antique land laws. H. J. C. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES "BEING ON DUTY" UNDER 'IHE HOURS OF SERVICE ACT.-
The Federal HouRs oF SERVICE ACT of 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 1415, Comp. St. 
1913, §§ 8677-8680) provides, in part, that it shall be "unlawful for any car-
rier * * * to require or permit any employe * * * to be or remain on duty 
for a longer period than sixteen consecutive hours;" with the further proviso 
in § 2: "Provided that no operator, train dispatcher, or other employe, who, 
by the use of telephone or telegraph dispatches, receives or delivers orders 
pertaining to or affecting train movements, shall he required or permitted 
to be or remain on duty for a longer period than nine hours in any twenty-
four hour period in all towers, offices, places and stations continuously ope-
rated night and day * * *·" A proviso is also stated, excusing such overtime 
service in case of "emergency, unavoidable accident, or act of God." In the 
recent case of Oregon Short Lille R. Co. v. United States, 234 Fed. 584, the 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant com-
pany was liable to the penalties imposed by this Act, even though the company 
had expressly forbidden and prohibited its telegraph operator to work more 
than nine hours, and he, in violation oi said instructions, put in three hours 
overtime without the company's knowledge, and not as an operator, but at 
clerical work ; that Congress had originally inserted the word "knowingly" 
before the word "permitted,'' but had later stricken it out, thereby showing 
the intention that the act should cover exactly such 4 case as that before the 
court; that the defendant was charged with knowledge of the acts of its ser-
vants; and that under any other view the manifest purpose of the statute 
would be defeated, as convictions would under such circumstances be prac-
tically impossible. ' 
As the Circuit Court of Appeals points out, the purpose of the Houm; OF 
SERVICE ACT is not penal, but remedial-to protect not only the employes of 
the railroads, but to protect also the safety of the public; and the courts have 
kept this purpose in view in their interpretation of the ACT and in their defini-
tion of its terms, as will appear from an examination of the cases that have 
arisen under the ACT. 
Thus the carrier cannot avoid the provision against requiring or permitting 
an employe from remaining on duty for a "longer period than nine hours in 
any twenty-four-hour period" by dividing the hours of service into two peri-
ods, if the aggregate hours of service each day of twenty-four hours exceed 
nine hours. U. S. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Te.ms, 189 Fed. 954 
As to the possibility of breaking up the period of service, THORNTON sum-
marizes the authority as follows: "The time can be divided, provided such 
break is bona fide and customary; the term "period" does not mean a cycle, 
or something continuous, as Congress had 110 intention of overriding such 
well known customs." THORN'l'ON. FEDERAT. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY AND SAFE-
TY APPLIANCES ACTS, (2 ed. § 246. In U. S. v. N orthem Pacific R. Co., 213 Fed. 
539, it was held that a lay-off of a train crew for one and one-half hours by 
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a superior while the train was held to permit superior trains to meet and pass, 
did not break the continuity of the service, but must be counted in the reck-
oning of sixteen hours. This decision was due to the fact that the necessity 
of such delay is not within the term "emergency," and also that such a lay-
off was not bona fide. On the other hand, a lay-off of three hours at noon by 
an authorized superior was held to be bona fide, as it was customary, and 
gave the employee a real opportunity for rest and recuperation. The court 
furthermore said tha_t this interpretation would not open the way to the 
abuse of working a man, say one hour in every three, thus giving him no 
real opportunity for rest and recuperation, as such cases would be covered 
by the provision that "all employes have at least eight consecutive hours off 
duty in each day, counting from some point in the next day." Atchison, T. 
and S. F. Ry. Co. v. U. S., II7 Fed. II4- So also in Southern Pacific Co. v. 
U. S.~ 222 Fed. 46, 137 C. C. A. 584, it was held that such a lay-off is bona 
fide, even during delay of a train, if it gives time for a substantial and oppor-
tune period of rest. 'fhe period of service cannot be broken by the crew it-
self, but only by order of a superior, as shown by the case of Denver & R. G. 
Ry. Co. v. U. S., 233 Fed. 62, in which the crew, after a derailment, retired 
to a farm house for food and rest, leaving the engine in charge of a watch-
man, until the arrival of the derrick, there being no superior present to re-
lease them. The period of rest was consequently counted in as part of the 
sixteen-hour period of service. 
As regards the phrase "office continuously operated night and day," it has 
been held that an office required to be kept open for business from 6 :30 a. m. 
to IO :30. p. m. is such an office, and no employe shall be permitted to work 
therein over nine hours per day. U. S. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra. 
An employe fo held to be "on duty" even though inactive, where he is 
under orders, and liable to be called at any moment, or where he is at his 
post in obedience to the rules of his superior whether actually at work, or 
simply awaiting orders. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 231 U. S. u2, 
34 Sup. Ct. :26, 58 L. Ed., U.S. v. Chicago & P. S. Ry. Co., 195 Fed. 783. 
It is also settled that the words "other employe" in § 2-"Provided that no 
operator, train dispatcher, or other employe who, by the use of telephone 
or telegraph dispatches, receives or delivers orders pertaining to or affecting 
train movements-etc." do not include train conductors. U. S. v. Florida 
East Coast Ry. Co., 222 Fed. 46, 137 C. C. A. 571. 
And now as to what causes of train delay are held to constitute "emergen-
cies, unavoidable accidents, or acts of God." It is held that while the terms 
do not include the ordinary accidents incidental to good railroading, a de-
railment is not incidental to good railroading, and the crew of a derailed train 
may be required to remain on duty for more than sixteen hours, and the 
company not be liable. U. S. v. Northern Pacific Co., 215 Fed. 64 Further-
more, it makes no difference whether the derailment was the result of the 
defendant's negligence or not. The question is not how the accident was 
brought about, but, having occurred, how can the public best be protected, 
and the company is intended to be left free to meet the emergencies as the 
best interests of the public demand. So, too, the unforeseeable insub-
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·ordination of a fellow employe, or his death, or illness, may constitute 
an "emergency" within the meaning of § 2, however, justifying the re-
tention of an operator overtime; and this regardless of the lack of justifica-
tion for such insubordination. U. S. v. Denver & R. G. Co., 220 Fed. 293, 
136 C. C. A. 275; U. S. v. Soutlzem Pacific Co., 209 Fed. 562, I26 C. C. A. 
384 In case of accident, the company is not deprived of the benefit of 
the proviso unless the accident was one which could have been foreseen 
and prevented by the exercise of the high degree of diligence demanded. 
Examples of such causes, deemed not sufficient to excuse the defendant, 
are: side-tracking for late train; running out of steam; hot box; un-
:usually heavy movement of grain; high wind" or storm causing delay, but 
not obstmctions or breaks in the track. U. S~ v. Kansas City Soutlzem Ry. 
Co., 202 Fed. 828, I2I C. C. A. 136; Great Northern Ry. v. U. S., 2I8 Fed. 
302, 134 C. C. A. g8. In case of wreck, if the crew is kept on duty wholly 
"because of the derailment, the defendant is excused for the overtime service, 
but if they could have been relieved after the wreck by the exercise of due 
-diligence, and were not, the benefit of the proviso is withdrawn from the 
company. San Pedro L. A. & S. L. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 220 Fed. 737, 136 C. C. 
A. 43. In another instance, the dispatcher lmew of a wreck on the line, but 
relied on a message from the wrecked train that the track would be cleared 
in thirty minutes, and sent ont a waiting train. Due to delay in clearing the 
track, the crew of the latter train was kept on duty more than sixteen hours, 
and it was held that the over-time service was caused, not by the derailment, 
but by the order of the dispatcher, and that the latter should have waited for 
more tmstworthy information, remarking that the "duty of the carrier to 
comply with the statute must be placed above its zeal to hasten transporta-
tion." H. R H. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF ARTICLES TAKEN FROM 'rHE ACCUSED OR HIS PREMISES 
WITHOUT A SEARCH W ARRANT.-In Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 48I, an 
indictment for fraudulent use of the United States mails, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that incriminatory articles, papers, 
etc., taken from the defendant's place of business by municipal policemen, 
without a search-warrant, could not be used as eYidence against him, because 
such action was violative of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Fed-
eral Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 
i::ause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The Fifth Amend-
ment provides inter alia, that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal 
i::ase to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop· 
erty without due process of law." 
The defendant was arrested by the municipal patrolmen without a warrant 
and taken to the post office building where he was arrested under a warrant 
charging a violation of a criminal code protecting the use of the mails. At 
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the same time the patrolmen arrested the accused without a search warrant 
they took his papers and books from his office to the post office. But no search 
warrant was even then sworn out against them. At the trial these papers 
were used as evidence and because of such use the Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision. 
The weight of authority is overwhelming against the instant case. 'With a 
few recent exceptions every state has an unbroken chain of decisions admitting 
evidence illegally obtained. Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35; Gindrat v. People, 
138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. 1085; Seibert v. People, I43 Ill. 57I, 32 N. E. 431; State 
v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479; Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 5I9, 32 N. E. 
910; State v. Kaub, IS Mo. _App. 433. The English doctrine is with these 
cases. R. v. Gra11atelli, 7 State Trials N. S. 979; Phelps v. Prew, 3 E. & 13. 
430, MI. 
Mr. \YIGMORE (§ 2264) holds that illegal seizure does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because historically considered our constitution makers incor-
porated it to secure the people against searches and seizures authorized by 
"general warrants" for the discovery of persons suspected of treasonable de-
signs or political intrigues; such warrants-so frequently issued in England 
just prior to our Revolution-were finally abolished hy the heroic fight of 
Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden, Eniick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. 
Tr. Io29. He contends that this provision was never intended to protect a 
party arrested upon reasonable suspicion of guilt, but that it was intended 
to protect the public from "general warrants" only. 
He further contends that books, papers and evidentiary articles illegally 
seized are competent as 'evidence and their admission does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment, because a man being compelled to testify against himself 
is 'one thing, and his property and papers testifying against him is an entirely 
different thing. His property is a mute but effective witness as much as any 
other competent witness whose testimony may have been secured by illegal 
means. The accused and his property are two distinct witnesses. 
Continuing (§ 2264) Mr. 'V'IGMORt argues that the admission of evidence 
illegally obtained would never "have suffered any judicial doubt but for a 
modern opinion in which * * * the seeds of a dangerous heresy were sown." 
Boyd v. United States, n6 U. S. 6!6. The case decides that it does not re-
quire actual entry of premises and sea;ch for and seizure of papers to con-
stitute an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, that a compulsory production by the defendant of private papers 
is a violation of said amendment and evidence obtained therefrom is inad-
missible if obtained without a search warrant. The decision of this case goes 
further in protecting the accused than the facts of the instant case call for. 
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, the facts are approximately the 
same as in the instant case, holding that where no search warrant has been 
duly issued in accordance with the Fourth Amendment all evidence obtained 
by such illegal search is inadmissible. 
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, (6 ed.) 370, goes so far as to say 
that a search warrant should not even be allowed for the purpose of obtain-
ing evidence, except in a few special cases where the subject of the crime is 
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concealed, and the public or complainant has an interest in its return or de-
struction. The power to search priYate books and papers should be author-
ized in extreme cases only. He says "the maxim that 'every man's house is 
his castle' is made a part of constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting 
searches and seizures and has always been looked upon as of high value to 
the citizen." LIEBER, CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GovERNMENT, 62, says "No man's 
house can be forcibly entered or he or his goods be carried away except in 
cases of felony, and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant." 
Mr. Justice BRADLEY-speaking in the Boyd case-is quoted in the· Weeks 
case, and the instant case as follows: "The principles laid down in this opin-
ion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security * * * they· 
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the 
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of 
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that com:titutes the essence of 
the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security r 
personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-
feited by his conviction of some public offence-it is the invasion of this. 
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's. 
judgment." 
According to these cases the effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put 
the courts and officers under limitations which are provided in the Fourth 
Amendment, that without a search warrant a man's private matters may not 
be searched, and that they may be searched under a search warrant only 
when the requirements of the Constitution are all present, to-wit: a reason-
able search, upon probable cause, supported by oath, with a particular descrip-
tion of the place or person to be searched. 
But granting that an illegal search and seizure is itself unlawful, the ques--
tion still remains, does this illegal taking so vitiate and disqualify the evi-
dence of crime thus obtained as to make it inadmissible as evidence? If so,, 
upon what theory? The instant case holds that the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments are so closely related in spirit and purpose that evidence obtained by 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and offered on trial, constitutes a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, because in effect it compels a man to incrim-
inate himself, and hence is inadmissible. 
The courts holding the contrary doctrine hold there is not so close a rela-
tion between the two amendments that the evidence by its illegal procurement 
becomes violative of the Fifth Amendment. 
The court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 395, in quoting from 
People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, says, "the underlying principle obviously is 
that the court, when engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice of 
the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers, or other 
articles of personal property, which are material and properly offered in evi-
dence." Many cases sustaining the above quoted theory may be found in a. 
note to State v. T1m1er, 82 Kan. 787, in I36 Am. St. Rep. 129 at page 135. 
It is left for future decisions to indicate what influence Weeks v. Unitec! 
States and the instant case, in following Boyd v. United States, will have upotr 
the old rule admitting illegally-obtained evidence to assist in convicting for-
crime. G. C. C.. 
